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Driving trans is hard.

Get the damn Oil into Pipelines & off of the “Mickey Mouse” Railroad !

Wie wär's mit bremsen?

Ну, вы американцы блин, даёте, жуть

SO, IN A SCHOOL ALL OF THIS IS NEEDED?

THERE HAS TO BE AN EASE OF REPORTING?

PERSONNEL HAS TO FILL OUT DATA?

THINGS TO OPEN THE MIND TO SMS POLICY IS EVENTS EVEN THOUGH THINKING AHEAD IS NEEDED?

A TECHNICAL QUALITY DATA SHEET IS USED TO TYPE IN THE SAFTEY UNLIKELY OR LIKELY THAT IS GONE THROUGH BY THE WHOLE MIDDLE TO MANAGERS AND CEO?

HAVE YOU HEARD OF TECHNICAL QUALITY DATA SHEETS?

A THIRD PARTY COULD BE USED?

SMS NEEDS TO IMPLEMENTED COMPANY WIDE?

ALSO, ON THE ISSUE OF MANUFACTURER PROBLEMS THERE IS THE CERTIFICATION BRANCH OF THE FAA USED TO AOC OFFICE? THEY LOOK INTO THE AIRPLANE TO SEE YOUR PROBLEM AND REPORTS IT TO THE MANUFACTURES AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE SMS INPUT?

SEE, THE SRM PILLAR IS KNOW TO SMS AS TWO ANSWER OF WHAT WILL AND WILL NOT HAPPEN ON A SCALE OF 1 TO FIVE FOR EACH ANSWERS FOR EXAMPLE?

THERE IS ALSO AUDITING MAINTENANCE RECORDS?

THERE IS ALSO FLIGHT FOLLOWING LIKE ASIAC?

IN CROSSTALK THERE IS FEEDBACK ON THE FLIGHT RELEASE SYSTEM?

AUDITING IS DONE THROUGH CHECKRIDES, CROSS TALK DURING FLIGHT PLANNING, FEEDBACK ON ACCIDENTS?

RECONGNIZE FOUR PILLARS OF SMS: RECOGNIZE SMS FUNCTION, FORM A SAFTEY POLICY, ACKNOLWEDGE SAFTEY RISK MANAGEMENT, FOR A SAFTEY CULTURE OR JUST CULTURE? ONE COMPANY USES A COMMENT BOX FOR ACKNOWLEDGE RISK AND SAFTEY CULTURE, LOOK AT ACCIDENTS OF THE AIRPLANE MODELS USED, FEEDBACK TO THE MANUFACTURER?

SO, WHEN DOES THE CLASS STOP???

THE PROCESSES USED TO IMPLEMENT SMS IS IDENTIFY HAZARDS, MONITOR SAFTEY, FACILITATE A CULTURE, MITIGATE HAZARDS?

ONE WAY TO DO A SRM IS SAFTEY CHECK BEFORE TAKEOFF?

COMPANIES MITIGATE KNOWN HAZARDS?

MITIGATING AN OCCURANCE IS SOMETHING A COMPANY MAY HAVE NO CONTROL OVER?

SMS ALLOWS FOR SRM MEASURES TO PREVENT ACCIDENTS BECAUSE IT CANNOT CONTROL WHAT IT DOES NOT KNOW ABOUT?

BLURRED LINES IS ALSO THE MANUFACTURER GIVING THE AIR CARRIER INFORMATION?

BLURRED LINES WITH RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPANIES CANNOT CONTROL SMS IN COMPANIES THEY CANNOT CONTROL?

ACTUAL FINDING COULD MEAN MORE SMS IS NEEDED?

SAFTEY SYSTEMS CAN BE IMPROVED BY PATHOLIGICAL SAFTEY CULTURE PREVENT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SMS?

IN 2015 PART 121 SMS REQUIREMENT?

IN 2010 THE FAA MADE AC 120-92 SMS REQUIREMENTS?

THE NTSB BEGAN SUGGESTING SMS COMPLIANCE IN 2007?

THERE IS AN ADVISORY 120-92 SMS RULE AVAILABLE?

AND, YOU CAN CHANGE YOUR PROCESSES AS STATED IN THE PART 5 PREAMBLE SO IF IT DOESN'T WORK THEN DON'T USE IT?

DO NOT IMPLEMENT PROCESSES TO PLEASE THE FAA IS CONTAINED IN PART 5 PREAMBLE LIKE IT PRODUCTS, NEW COMPUTERS ETC? BUT YOU DO NOT NEED TO BEAT THE FAA RULE?

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE WITH YOUR EXISTANT SMS SYSTEM THE AIR CARRIER NEEDS TO DO A GAP ANYLYSIS TO CHECK THE PREFORMANCE AGAINST THE OUTCOMES?

A BETTER SMS STRUCTURE IN THE SMS CULTURE AND WITH THE SRM DATA NEEDS TO BE MONITORED AND IMPROVEMENTS ARE MADE THEN THAT GIVES A BETTER OUTCOME?

ADDING STRUCTURE GIVES BETTER OUTCOME?

THE PART 5 ASKS FOR AN AUDIT LIKE SRM DATA?

IN PART 5 THERE IS A PREAMBLE THAT EXPLAINS APPLICABLE AND SCALABILTY?

THE SAFTEY PLAN THE AIR CARRIER MAKES IS THE FINISHED PRODUCT OF SMS?

APPLICABILITY MEANS THAT WHO MUST MUST MEET MINIMUM?

SCALBILITY MEANS DO OR DON'T HAVE TO MEET REQUIREMENT?

IS THE PART 5 RULE FOR ONLY PART 135?

THE PROPOSED RULEMAKING IS AVAILABLE ON FEDERALREGISTER.GOV ?

ICAO RULE MAKING WAS INFLUENCED BY THE NTSB INCLUDES OPERATOR SAFTEY FOR PART 91 AND PART 121?

ICAO STATES THAT SMS SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY ALL OPERATORS?

SMS IS A FORMAL SYSTEM TO IDENTIFY AND RISK MANAGEMENT OF RISKS IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE?

US railroad companies continue to get away with violating rest regulations, running trains within the safety margin of weight and brake capacity, non-compliance with safety regulations and generally dragging their feet on anything and everything that could be considered safety-over-budget (like e.g. installing an advanced warning system that emergency stops the train if the driver falls asleep). And there is no indication that the NTSB, the departement of transportation itself or any state want to do anything about it because freight rail is already behind in the US. And so the vicous cycle continues. The more I think about it, US rail is really a microcosm of the US political climate in general. The only thing that counts is the profit margin. *Anything* else - and be it the loss of hundreds of lives - is secondary to that goal. If it is thought about at all.

If you reach V1, you *have* to take it to the air or you'll crash - that's what V1 means. The inverse of that is: Don't go past V1 if you're not positive you can fly the thing. The PIC didn't even take 5 seconds between getting the error message (relayed by his SIC) and pushing the lever anyway. There is no way he actually thought about what the light meant - he just said "not now" and tried to take off...